INTRODUCTION

The present case analysis examines together the decisions of the Supreme Court in the captioned case and the subsequent order passed in the same case on 17.11.2025. Both decisions arise out of proceedings under the POSH Act[1] (hereinafter “the Act”) and concern the rejection of a complaint filed by the appellant as barred by limitation.

The first judgment addresses whether subsequent administrative actions can be said to be acts “connected with” sexual harassment so as to extend the limitation as prescribed under Section 9 of the Act. The Court examined the scope of sexual harassment under the Act, the distinction between continuing and recurring wrongs and the scope of judicial interference with findings on limitation.

The second decision / subsequent order concerns a miscellaneous application filed by the Respondent seeking expunction of certain observations made in the earlier judgment, particularly para 34 of the Judgement dated 12.09.2025. It raises a related question regarding the limits of judicial observations where no finding on merits has been recorded.

Read together, these decisions engage with the interplay between procedural limitation, substantive allegations of workplace harassment and the consequences of judicial remarks in the absence of adjudicated guilt.

FACTS

The Appellant submitted a written complaint on 26.12.2023 before the Local Complaints Committee (LCC). In the said complaint, she alleged that she had been subjected to acts constituting sexual harassment by the Respondent herein.

In her complaint the appellant alleged that in September 2019 the respondent called her to his office, proposed that she accompany him for dinner and touched her in a manner that caused her discomfort. In October 2019, he allegedly repeated such acts, demanded sexual favours and threatened adverse consequences if his advances were declined. During the relevant period, the Executive Council deferred consideration of her promotion. However, in April 2022, the recommendations made by the Selection Committee were approved, and she was accordingly promoted.

It was further alleged in the complaint that in April 2023, the Respondent called the Appellant to his office and requested her to accompany him on a visit to a resort. Upon her declining the said request, he allegedly stated that adverse consequences would follow and that her professional prospects would be affected. Thereafter, on 29.08.2023, the Appellant received a communication removing her from the position of Director, Centre of Financial, Regulatory and Governance Studies (CFRGS). During the same period, certain representations were received concerning irregularities in relation to project matters of the appellant, pursuant to which the Executive Council initiated a preliminary inquiry regarding the utilisation of grant funds.

The appellant alleged that removal from the directorship and the initiation of inquiry formed part of a pattern of victimisation connected with the earlier acts of sexual harassment.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Proceedings before the Local Complaint Committee (LCC)

Upon receipt of the complaint dated 26.12.2023, the LCC examined the complaint’s maintainability under Section 9 of the Act. The LCC dismissed the complaint at the preliminary stage on the grounds of limitation. It recorded that the last alleged incident had taken place in April 2023, whereas the complaint was instituted in December 2023. The Committee held that the complaint was filed beyond the statutory period of three months prescribed under the Act, as well as beyond the further extendable period of three months and was therefore time-barred.

Writ Petition before the Single Judge, Calcutta High Court

Being dissatisfied with the dismissal of her complaint, the Appellant approached the Calcutta High Court by filing a writ petition. The learned Single Judge allowed the petition, quashed the order passed by the LCC and directed that the complaint be reconsidered on its merits. The Court observed that subsequent developments could be examined to determine whether they formed part of a continuing or hostile work environment and that such circumstances were relevant while computing the period of limitation.

Intra-Court Appeal before the Division Bench

The Respondent assailed the order of the learned Single Judge by way of an intra-court appeal before the Division Bench, wherein the Division Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and restored the order passed by the LCC. It was held that the administrative measures taken subsequent to April 2023 were decisions of the Executive Council in its collective capacity and could not be construed as acts of sexual harassment. Consequently, such actions were held to be irrelevant for the purpose of extending or computing the period of limitation.

Appeal before the Supreme Court

The appellant preferred an appeal (SLP which culminated in a civil appeal) before the Supreme Court. By judgment dated 12.09.2025, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the Division Bench. The Court concluded that the complaint had been instituted beyond the prescribed period of limitation and was, therefore, barred by law.

Miscellaneous Application for Expunction

Subsequent to the dismissal of the appeal, the respondent filed a miscellaneous application seeking expunction of certain observations contained in paragraph 34 of the judgment, particularly the direction requiring that the judgment be made part of his resume. By order dated 17.11.2025, the Supreme Court allowed the application to the limited extent of deleting the said direction, clarifying that no finding of guilt had been recorded on merit.

ISSUE(S)

1. Whether the complaint dated 26.12.2023 was barred by limitation under Section 9 of the Act?

2. Whether, in the absence of any finding of guilt on merits, the Court was justified in issuing a direction that the judgment be made part of the respondent’s resume?

HOLDING / DECISION

1. On Limitation under Section 9 of the Act

The Supreme Court held that the complaint dated 26.12.2023 was barred by limitation under Section 9 of the Act.

The Court held that the last alleged act of sexual harassment had taken place in April 2023. It held that the later administrative measures, including the Appellant’s removal from the office of Director and the commencement of inquiry proceedings, were decisions taken collectively by the Executive Council. Such actions were found to be independent in nature and not intrinsically linked to the earlier allegations of sexual misconduct. The Court further held that these subsequent events could neither be construed as acts of sexual harassment nor regarded as part of a continuing cause of action so as to enlarge the statutory period of limitation.

In view thereof, by judgment dated 12.09.2025, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court and upheld the order of the Local Complaints Committee dismissing the complaint as barred by limitation.

2. On Expunction of Stigmatic Direction

In the subsequent miscellaneous application preferred by the Respondent, the Supreme Court held that, since no finding of guilt on merits had been recorded against the Respondent, the direction requiring that the judgment be made part of his resume was liable to be deleted.

The Court clarified that it had not indicted the respondent on the merits and, therefore, allowed the application to the limited extent of expunging the sentence contained in paragraph 34 of the earlier judgment.

REASONING / RULE OF LAW

1. Interpretation of “Sexual Harassment” and Limitation

It would be pertinent to first examine the statutory framework under Sections 2(n)[2], 3[3] and 9[4] of the Act. As per the definition under Section 2(n), “Sexual harassment” includes not only overt acts such as physical contact, demand for sexual favours, or sexually coloured remarks, but also circumstances connected with such conduct, including implied or explicit threats of detrimental treatment or creation of a hostile work environment.

For the purpose of limitation under Section 9, a complaint is required to be instituted within a period of three months from the date of the alleged incident. In cases involving a series of incidents, the period is to be computed from the date of the last such incident. The Act further permits an extension of an additional three months, provided sufficient cause is demonstrated. While the issue of limitation is generally regarded as a mixed question of fact and law, where, on a plain reading of the averments contained in the complaint, it is apparent that the claim is barred by time, the same may be dismissed at the preliminary stage, applying the principle analogous to Order VII Rule 11[5]  of the Code of Civil Procedure. [6]

Upon consideration of the complaint, the Court concluded that the last alleged instance of sexual harassment had taken place in April 2023. It further held that the subsequent administrative steps, including the Appellant’s removal from the position of Director and the commencement of inquiry proceedings, were decisions taken collectively by the Executive Council on distinct and independent grounds.

The Court found that such measures did not bear a direct or proximate connection with the earlier allegations of sexual misconduct. Accordingly, they were held not to fall within the scope of the expressions “in relation to or connected with sexual harassment as contemplated under Section 3(2).”

The Court further drew a clear distinction between a “continuing wrong” and a “recurring wrong.” [7] It was observed that the alleged incident of April 2023 was complete in itself and did not subsist or continue thereafter. It was not of such a nature as to give rise to a continuing cause of action. Accordingly, the period of limitation was held to commence from April 2023. Since the complaint was instituted in December 2023, it exceeded the outer limit of six months contemplated under Section 9 of the Act.

It was thus clarified that, for the purposes of Section 9, limitation must be computed from the date of the last alleged act of sexual harassment. Subsequent administrative measures, in the absence of a direct and proximate nexus with the alleged misconduct, cannot be relied upon to extend limitation under the pretext of a continuing wrong. [8]

2. Limits on Judicial Observations in the Absence of Adjudicated Guilt

In the subsequent miscellaneous application, the Court considered whether it was appropriate to retain a direction requiring that the judgment be made part of the respondent’s resume, despite there being no finding of guilt on the merits.

Although the intention behind the observation was to apprise the public of the incident, no adjudication on merits had been rendered against the respondent. In the absence of a finding of misconduct or offence, retention of a stigmatic direction would amount to imposing a consequence without a formal determination of guilt.

Accordingly, the Court deleted the impugned sentence, reaffirming the principle that judicial observations must remain consistent with the findings actually recorded and cannot operate as a punitive or stigmatic measure in the absence of adjudicated liability.

CRITICAL COMMENTARY / ANALYSIS

The decision represents a strict and textually grounded interpretation of limitation under Section 9 of the Act. The Court’s approach prioritises procedural certainty and statutory compliance over a broader, purposive understanding of workplace harassment. By identifying April 2023 as the last incident and rejecting subsequent administrative measures as unrelated, the Court reaffirmed that the limitation must be computed with reference to a clearly identifiable act of sexual harassment.[9]

From a doctrinal standpoint, the reasoning is justifiable. Section 9 prescribes a definite time frame and the Court correctly emphasised that the expressions “in relation to” or “connected with” under Section 3(2) require a direct nexus with sexual misconduct. The distinction drawn between a “continuing wrong” and a completed act reflects the application of the well-settled principles of limitation. The Court was cautious not to convert every adverse employment action into an extension of earlier allegations, particularly where the subsequent measures were collective decisions of the Executive Council.

However, the judgment also exposes a structural tension within the POSH framework. Workplace harassment often manifests not merely through isolated overt acts, but through subtle retaliation, exclusion, or professional marginalisation. By treating the April 2023 incident as a complete and isolated act, the Court adopted a narrow evidentiary lens. The finding that the later actions lacked a direct nexus is based on their formal character as administrative decisions. In practice, power asymmetries in academic institutions may operate in more indirect ways. A more contextual analysis might have considered whether retaliation can coexist with formal institutional decision-making, especially when allegations are against a person in a position of authority.[10]

The analogy to Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejecting the complaint at the threshold further strengthens procedural discipline but simultaneously limits fact-finding. While efficiency is important, premature rejection may risk foreclosing inquiry in sensitive matters where evidence is not immediately apparent on the face of the complaint.

The original direction requiring inclusion of the judgment in the respondent’s resume operated as a form of reputational sanction despite the absence of an adjudicated finding of guilt.[11] Its deletion restores coherence between findings and consequences and reinforces the principle that stigma cannot substitute for adjudication. In that sense, the second order corrects an overreach in the first.[12]

Taken together, the decisions underscore two competing imperatives: strict adherence to statutory limitation and the need for judicial restraint in the absence of formal findings. While the Court’s reasoning strengthens procedural certainty under the Act, it also highlights the need for legislative reconsideration of limitation periods in cases involving workplace power dynamics, where delayed reporting is neither uncommon nor necessarily indicative of the absence of a grievance.

CONCLUSION

The combined effect of the two decisions clarifies the legal position on limitation and judicial restraint under the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed that a complaint under Section 9 must strictly satisfy the statutory time frame and that limitation is to be computed from the date of the last identifiable act of sexual harassment. Subsequent administrative actions, in the absence of a direct and demonstrable nexus with sexual misconduct, cannot be treated as extending limitation under the ambit of a continuing wrong. This reinforces procedural certainty and prevents expansion of statutory timelines beyond legislative intent.

At the same time, the Court’s subsequent order deleting the stigmatic direction ensures doctrinal consistency between adjudication and consequence. Where no finding of guilt has been recorded on merits, judicial observations cannot assume a punitive or reputational character. The expunction order restores alignment with principles of fairness and due process.

Read together, the rulings strike a balance between strict statutory interpretation and the limits of judicial power. They underscore that while allegations of workplace harassment must be addressed within the framework prescribed by law, judicial outcomes must remain confined to the findings actually recorded.

REFERENCES

[1] The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 2013 (India).

[2] The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 2013, § 2(n) (India).

[3] The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 2013, § 3 (India).

[4] The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 2013, § 9 (India).

[5] The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, No. 5, Acts of Parliament, 1908, O. VII r. 11 (India).

[6] The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, No. 5, Acts of Parliament, 1908 (India).

[7]Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2008) 8 SCC 648.

[8] NUJS VC Resume Must Include Court Order on His Sexual Misconduct: SC, SCC Online Blog (Sep. 16, 2025), https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2025/09/16/nujs-vc-resume-must-include-court-order-on-his-sexual-misconduct-sc/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2026).

[9] A. Sinha & F. Bondestam, Moving Beyond Bureaucratic Grey Zones: Managing Sexual Harassment in Indian Higher Education, 84 HIGHER EDUC. 469 (2022).

[10] N. Kapur, Workplace Sexual Harassment: The Way Things Are, 48 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 27 (2013).

[11] SC Relief to Ex-NUJS VC in Alleged Incidents of Sexual Misconduct Case, SCC Online Blog (Nov. 22, 2025), https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2025/11/22/sc-relief-to-ex-nujs-vc-alleged-incidents-of-sexual-misconduct-case/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2026).

[12] A. Sarpotdar, Sexual Harassment of Women: Reflections on the Private Sector, 48 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 18 (2013)